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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE O,F UTAH 
THOMAS R. BROADBENT, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
UNITED STA TES FIDELITY AND 
GUARANTY COMPANY, 




RE-STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The statement of facts contained in respondent's brief 
1s incomplete in several particulars, and it is therefore 
necessary to add the following facts to be considered in 
conjunction with the statement of facts made in appel-
lant's brief. At pages 4 and 5 of respondent's brief, re-
spondent points to comments made by Dr. Broadbent to 
the effect that Dr. Broadbent miscalculated the radium 
dosage and the size of the tumor. Respondent also points 
to statements of plaintiff that at the time the Radon seeds 
were implanted he was not aware that his patient had 
had prior radium treatment in Europe. Based on this dis-
covery respondent notes that plaintiff wondered if his 
1 
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patient had received a cumulative dosage of Radon which 
caused the adverse effects. Respondent failed to mention, 
however, that Dr. Broadbent made all these observations 
as part of his diagnostic attempt to isolate the cause of the 
greater than anticipated effects; and that investigation 
into the above matters all indicated no miscalculations or 
over-dosages. In the first place, Dr. Broadbent did not 
become aware of the prior radium treatment until Janu-
ary 11, 1957, several years after the implantation of the 
Radon seeds. (Broadbent depo. p. 31). Upon investiga-
tion, Dr. Broadbent ascertained that the dosage in the 
prior radium treatment had been trivial and that even 
if he had known of the prior radium treatment, the dosage 
which he had prescribed for his patient would have been 
the same. (Broadbent depo. pp. 34-35). There was no 
cumulative effect considering both radium treatments. 
(Broadbent depo. p. 35). The dosage actually given to 
the patient was very conservative. (Broadbent depo. p. 
58). Dr. Broadbent recomputed the dosage given with 
respect to the size of the tumor and ascertained that there 
had been no miscalculation as to either the dosage or the 
size of the tumor. (Broadbent depo. pp. 35-38). 
Respondent also failed to mention that the patient's 
side effects were caused only partially by the radium 
treatment: the tumor itself and infection contributed sig-
nificantly to the deterioration. (Broadbent depo. p. 36). 
2 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE THIRD JUDIOAL DISTRICT COURT IN 
AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, ERRED IN EN-
TERING SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR DEFEND-
ANT AND RESPONDENT UNITED STATES FIDEL-
ITY AND GUARANTY COMP ANY. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A. PLAINTIFF GAVE TIMELY NOTICE. 
In countering plaintiff's cases respondent has cited 
several cases involving professional liability insurance 
policies which respondent asserts support his position that 
proper notice was not given. Both appellant and respon-
dent rely on Sohm vs. United States Fid. & Guar., 352 
F.2d 65 (6th Cir. 1965). The facts of Sohm, as noted in 
appellant's brief, are clearly distinguishable from the in-
stant case. In that case, another physician showed Dr. 
Sohm the surgical error that had been made and Dr. 
Sohm still failed to notify his insurance carrier. As noted 
in appellant's brief, the case clearly stands for the propo-
sition which is supportive of plaintiff's position, that 
notice need only be given when the physician actually be-
comes aware of the injury arising out of error, negligence 
or malpractice. 
Respondent also cites the cases of Falk vs. Sul Ameri-
ca Terrestres Maritimos E. Accidentes Companhia De 
Sequros, 465 P.2d 714 (Ore. 1970), and Bergh vs. 
3 
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Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 197 So.2d 847 (Fla. App. 
1967). Those cases are also clearly distinguishable on 
their facts. In the Bergh case plaintiff had received 
a letter from his patient's attorney which recited a 
claim for negligence against him, and had also been 
sued by the patient prior to the time when notice was 
forwarded to the company. In the Falk case, Dr. Falk 
received a letter from another physician who informed 
him that Falk had not detected an injury while treating 
the patient. As can be noted in both of these cases, a 
definite claim for negligence was made and the doctors 
were unquestionably aware that a claim was or might 
be made against them for malpractice. In the case at hand, 
Dr. Broadbent received no complaints whatsoever during 
the entire period of treatment. He verified the dosage, 
both with the company and with other specialists. No 
miscalculations, errors or omissions were detected or 
brought to his attention by anyone. Only when he re-
ceived the letter from his patient's attorney was he aware 
that any claim would be made against him for negligence, 
malpractice, or error. 
Respondent also cites the Utah cases of Amundson v. 
Mutual Benefit, Health & Acc. Assoc., 13 U.2d 407, 375 
P.2d 463 (1962); Dunn v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 
100 Utah 111, 110 P.2d 561, (1941), and Anderson v. 
Beneficial Fire & Cas. Co., 21 U.2d 173, 442 P.2d 933 
( 1968). These three cases are distinguishable either fac-
tually or legally from the instant case. In the first place 
all three deal either with life or accident insurance policies 
and involve situations where a beneficiary or an insured 
4 
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did not make proper notice from some clearly ascertain-
able date, such as the date of death or the date of a fire 
loss. In the case at hand, there is no such clearly ascer-
tainable date when it became clear to Dr. Broadbent or 
anyone else that a claim could or would be made. The 
date when plaintiff received notice from his patient's 
attorney is the only clear ascertainable date in this case 
which could be used as a guideline for setting a period 
within which notice must be rendered. And, of course, 
plaintiff rendered notice immediately after being informed 
of the claim. From this standpoint defendant's cases have 
no bearing on the instant case. Simply because the court 
found improper notice in those cases does not make those 
cases dispositive of the case at hand. 
Respondent makes particular reference t o t h e 
Amundson case primarily for the purpose of establishing 
the six-year period of limitation applicable to written 
instruments as the outside limitation for the filing of 
notice under a professional liability policy. Assuming 
Amundsen would have application to the instant case, Dr. 
Broadbent complied. Once Dr. Broadbent received notice 
from his patient's attorney, he immediately notified his 
insurance company. That date is the only date from which 
the time computation could be made. As noted above, 
there was no prior definite time or event which could be 
relied upon for the basis of the computation of the six-year 
period. The most that can be said is that there was a 
continuum of activity from the time the Radon seeds were 
implanted until actual written claim was made. Any 
5 
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estimate as to a date or event prior to the date that the 
written complaint was received from which the six-year 
period of time could be said to run, would be based ex-
clusively on conjecture and surmise. 
In considering the impact of the Amundson case, it 
must be realized that no subsequent Utah case has adopted 
or expanded upon the rule of the six-year limitation. 
Moreover, it must be recognized that the approach taken 
by the court in that case is indeed novel and not supported 
by any other decision or line of reasoning found by plain-
tiff or by defendant. It seems quite clear the holding in 
Amundson must be confined to its facts and not extended 
to other factual situations such as the one at hand where 
there is no logic or reason to support the application of 
such a limitation. 
B. LATE NOTICE, IF ANY, IS EXCUSED SINCE 
PLAINTIFF REASONABLY BELIEVED NO 
CLAIM FOR INJURIES WOULD RESULT. 
Respondent seems to believe that appellants are re-
lying exclusively on the doctrine of trivial occurrence to 
excuse late notice as that doctrine is set forth in the case 
of Johnson Ready-Mix Concrete Co. v. United Pac. Ins. 
Co., 11 U.2d 279, 358 P.2d 337 (1961). Respondent mis-
takes appellant's position. The argument and cases cited 
in appellant's brief stand for the proposition that one need 
only report an injury the circumstances of which would 
cause a reasonable and prudent man to suspect that a claim 
might arise therefrom. Appellant's position is that the 
events surrounding the treatment of Miss Gyr at no time 
6 
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indicated to a reasonable and prudent man that a claim 
for malpractice would be made. 
C. LA TE NOTICE, IF ANY, IS EXCUSED SINCE 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT PREJUDICED THEREBY. 
Respondent contends that the great weight of author-
ity in the United States is to the effect that the insurance 
carrier need not establish prejudice. As primary support 
for that proposition, respondent cites State Farm Mutual 
Auto Ins. Co. vs. Cassinelli, 67 Nev. 156, 216 P.2d 606 
(1950), Annot. 76 A.LR. 23, 183 (1932); and Annot. 18 
A.LR. 2d 443 (1951). As is obvious, the latest cited 
authority is 1951. Clearly, since 1951 the law in this 
particular area and the weight of authority has shifted 
drastically. Appellant would invite consideration of sup-
plements to 18 A.LR.2d 443 and the cases cited therein 
to the effect that the courts in at least 15 states where 
the proposition has been presented have adopted the rule 
that the insurer, in order to be relieved of liability, 
must show that it has suffered prejudice because of the 
insured's non-compliance with provision as to notice. 
These states include most of the jurisdictions adjoining 
Utah as indicated in appellant's brief. 
Respondent further states that the insurer need not 
prove prejudice especially in those cases where notice is 
a condition precedent to suit on the policy. Respondent 
cites only the Cassinelli case and various general proposi-
tions in the above referenced annotations which are pres-
ently out of date. The more current view is that the in-
7 
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surer must establish prejudice even if notice is set as a 
condition precedent to suit on the policy. For example, 
in the case of Cooper v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 
51 N. J. 86, 237 A.2d 870 (1968), notice was made a con-
dition precedent to a suit on the policy. In that case the 
court held that in spite of the provisions in the policy the 
insurer had to prove appreciable prejudice. The burden 
of persuasion was explicitly placed on the insurer. Cooper 
v. Government Employees Ins. Co., supra, at 874. In the 
case of Lindus v. Northern Ins. Co., 103 Ariz. 160, 438 
P.2d 311 (1968) the Arizona Supreme Court held that 
the insurer is not relieved of responsibility of proving ac-
tual prejudice even where the policy makes notice an ex-
press condition precedent to suit. See Lindus v. Northern 
Ins. Co., supra, at 315. Attention is invited to the multi-
tude of cases cited at that particular page supporting the 
court's decision. Further attention is called to the Penn-
sylvania case of Frank v. Nash, 166 Pa. Super. 476, 71 
A.2d 835 (1950), wherein the Pennsylvania court held 
that the failure to furnish the suit papers to the insured 
did not of itself avoid the policy in the absence of prej-
udice to the insurer even where the policy expressly made 
compliance with the notice provision a condition prece-
dent to the insurer's liability. For additional support, see 
Joyce v. United Ins. Co., 21 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1962). Based 
on the foregoing cases, the current trend is clearly away 
from the proposition stated by respondent. The courts 
are understandably recognizing that there is no necessity 
of relieving the insurer from liability unless there is 
prejudice; if the insurer is not disadvantaged, no harm 
results in not relieving it from liability. 
8 
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D. PLAINTIFF'S REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS 
AS A LAY PURCHASER OF LIABILI1Y INSUR-
ANCE SHOULD BE REWARDED. 
Respondent objects to the underlying insurance contract 
being treated as an adhesion contract and asserts that the 
current judicial method of interpreting such contracts has 
no place in our law. Respondent further objects to the case 
of Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 409 P.2d 168 
( 1966), stating that the referenced sections in appellant's 
brief are sheer dictum. The case and the quotations there-
from are cited not for the holding but for the method used 
in interpreting the underlying contract. Whether one re-
fers to standardized contracts as adhesion contracts or by 
some other name, the fact nevertheless exists that a con-
siderable body of law has developed over the years in-
terpreting these standardized contracts between individ-
uals of disparate bargaining power which are given to 
the individual on a "take it or leave it" basis. Respondent 
asserts that both parties are bound by the clear and un-
equivocal terms of a contract regardless of the background 
of the negotiations and other circumstances surrounding 
the execution of the contract. The courts have traditionally 
exercised wide discretion in enforcing strictly the terms 
of a contract when strict compliance would result in an 
injustice. As Justice Frankfurter stated in his dissent in 
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 326 
(1942): 
It is said that familiar principles would be 
outraged if Bethlehem were denied recovery on 
these contracts. But is there any principle which is 
9 
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more familiar or firmly embedded in the history 
of Anglo-American Law than the basic doctrine 
that the courts will not permit themselves to be 
used as instruments of inequity and injustice? Does 
any principle in our law have more universal ap-
plication than the doctrine that courts will not 
enforce transactions in which the relative positions 
of the parties are such that one has unconscionably 
taken advantages of the necessities of the other? 
These principles are not foreign to the law 
of contracts. Fraud and physical duress are not 
the only grounds upon which courts refuse to en-
force contracts. The law is not so primitive that it 
sanctions every injustice except brute force and 
downright fraud. More specifically, the courts 
generally refuse to lend themselves to the enforce-
ment of a "bargain" in which one party has un-
justly taken advantage of the economic necessities 
of the other .... 
Respondent states that he has been unable to find 
any law involving adhesion contracts. By statute in Utah 
the court may refuse to enforce a contract or a clause 
therein if it is unconscionable. §70A-2-302 Utah Code 
Ann. (Repl. Vol. 1953). In the area of express disclaimers 
of warranties in standardized contracts and the refusal of 
courts to enforce the same, appellant would refer the court 
to the well-known case of Henningson v. Bloomfield 
Motors, 32 N. J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). In that par-
ticular case the court refused to give effect to a disclaimer 
of implied warranty of merchantability. In denying effect 
to that part of the contract, the court stated as follows: 
The traditional contract is the result of free 
bargaining of parties who are brought together by 
the play of the market, and who meet each other 
10 
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on a footing of approximate economic equality. In 
such a society there is no danger that freedom of 
contract will be a threat to the social order as a 
whole. But in present day commercial life the 
standardized mass contract has appeared. It is 
~sed primarily by enterprises with strong bargain-
mg power and position. . . . Such standardized 
contracts have been described as those in which 
one predominate party will dictate its law to an 
undetermined multiple rather than to an individ-
ual. They are said to resemble a law rather than 
a meeting of the minds. Henningson v. Bloomfield 
Motors, supra, at 86. 
The court continued as follows: 
The task of the judiciary is to administer the 
spirit as well as the letter of the law. On issues 
such as the present one, part of the burden is to 
protect the ordinary man against the loss of im-
portant rights through what, in effect, is the uni-
lateral act of the manufacturer. Henningson v. 
Bloomfield Motors, supra, at 94. 
The strict method of interpreting standardized con-
tracts can be found in cases dealing with contracts involv-
ing baggage checks containing clauses restricting liability 
of common carriers for loss or damage in transit; See S.S. 
Ansaldo San Giorgio I. v. Rheimstrom Bros. Co., 294 U. S. 
494 (1935); limitations on parcel checkroom tickets; see 
]ones v. Great Northern Railway Co., 68 Mont. 231, 217 
P. 673 (1923); on storage warehouse receipts; French v. 
Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 118 Colo. 424, 195 P.2d 
968 (1948); on automobile parking lot or garage tickets 
or claim checks, Hoel v. Flower City Fuel & Transfer Co., 
144 Minn. 280, 175 N.W. 300 (1919); and also excul-
11 
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patory clauses in leases releasing landlords of apartments 
from liability for negligence, see Annot. 175 A.LR. 8 
(1948). The same general principle has been applied to 
the standardized bank passbook. See Los Angeles Inv. Co. 
v. Home Savings Bank, 180 Cal. 601, 182 P. 293 (1919). 
Based on the foregoing authorities, it is clear that 
the strong interpretative stance taken by the courts against 
the standardized contract is not new in the law. The case 
of Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., supra, was cited only for the 
proposition that the same method of interpreting adhesion 
contracts has been applied to insurance contracts. For 
additional support see Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of 
New York, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172, 377 P.2d 284 (1962), with 
particular emphasis on pages 294-97, and the footnotes 
attached thereto. 
Appellant again maintains that the standardized con-
tract under question must be considered and interpreted 
according to the guidelines set down by the courts, taking 
into consideration the method of execution, and the ex-
pectations of the parties concerned. Dr. Broadbent as a 
layman would reasonably expect that he should give notice 
under the terms of his policy once he himself became 
aware of any claim against him. This he in fact did. One 
would not reasonably expect the doctor to make claim for 
an injury not caused by negligence, malpractice or error 
on his part and about which he had received no complaint. 
12 
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E. THIS CASE IS NOT RIPE FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
In the first place there is a factual issue as to whether 
plaintiff gave timely notice under the policy. As is noted 
in both appellant's and respondent's briefs, whether notice 
was timely given or not depends upon the facts and cir~ 
cumstances of each individual case. The facts and circum-
stances can only be fully explored and developed at trial. 
This appellant has not had the opportunity of doing. Wit-
nesses and records need to be consulted which are not now 
in the record. Respondent claims that the mere fact that 
the reactions developed as they did is sufficient to war-
rant affirming the summary judgment. Appellant denies 
this. Moreover, there is a factual question as to whether 
notice would be excused under the circumstances of the 
case. Respondent alleges this is merely a question of law. 
To the contrary, this is an issue of fact, since the excuse, 
if any, would be predicated on a factual finding that a 
reasonable and prudent doctor acting in Dr. Broadbent's 
place would or would not have had sufficient facts at 
his disposal to cause him to tender notice. This determina-
tion can only be made after full exploration of all facts, 
witnesses and evidence, some of which has not been placed 
in the record and cannot be fully explored until trial. 
Appellant also contends there is an issue of fact remain-
ing as to whether defendant has been prejudiced by any 
late notice. Again, this is a factual issue depending upon 
when the duty to notify arose, and what actions defendant 
could have taken, if any, to reduce any alleged prejudice. 
This is a matter which can only be explored fully at trial 
after full disclosure of all evidence. Based on the author-
13 
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1t1es set forth in appellant's brief, it is again submitted 
that there are genuine issues of material facts which re-
main in this case and which must be submitted to a jury. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant again respectfully submits that no duty de-
volved upon Dr. Broadbent to render notice until the 
actual complaint was made against him. If a duty de-
volved at an earlier time, the failure to render notice is 
either excused as being not sufficient to indicate to a rea-
sonable and prudent man that a claim would be made or 
is excused because of lack of prejudice to the insurer. Ap-
pellant submits that the contract in question must be 
interpreted most strongly against insurer and the reason-
able expectations of the doctor should be rewarded. Mate-
rial issues of fact remain in this case, and it is therefore re-
quested that the court vacate the summary judgment en-
tered by the lower court and remand this matter for fur-
ther proceedings including trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON, BALDWIN, 
BRANDT & WADSWORTH 
By 
REX J. HANSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Appellant 
702 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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